A No-Resolution Resolution--And The Game Goes On

As the Geek has posted previously, no one ought to underestimate Gaddafi (or Khadafi, or whichever alternative you prefer.)  The man is a very clever person--and never more clever than when his survival is threatened.  His response to the UN Security Council "all necessary means" vote demonstrates that--in spades.

His tone turned from flaming defiance--all air and maritime traffic in the Mediterranean will become a target--to one of pure peace and transparency--all military operations will be stopped and, why don't you all come by and see the situation for yourselves--in a matter of hours.  The change was so fast and hard that observers may have gotten whiplash as a result.

Gaddafi will do whatever is necessary to keep  himself in power.  Even if his power is limited effectively to those towns where his troops are in unquestioned control, it is Gaddafi power.  Even if his tenure in office seems to be limited by the ongoing sanctions, he has, at the very least, bought some of that most precious commodity--time.  He is of the view that time must be on his side.

Time gives opportunity.  In Gaddafi's case the opportunity being sought for exploitation is the split between the major powers of the European Union as well as the chasm separating the stance of the most bellicose governments from the support of the majority of their populations.  There is already a yawning gulf between France and the UK on the one hand and Germany on the other.  There is already a palpable lack of enthusiasm within the French (and other people) for any more war within a Muslim state.  Even in the UK, which has hung longest and toughest in the Afghanistan effort, one sees a notable dearth of let's-get-the-bastard-out sentiment among the Brits generally.

Time also provides an opportunity to develop mechanisms to evade the sanctions so far imposed.  Time provides Gaddafi with the opportunity to explore inviting Russian and Chinese interests to take over the oilfield operations from the European companies whose governments have "betrayed" Gaddafi's faith.

Time allows for the erosion of support for the insurgent forces.  It allows for divisions within the insurgents to emerge, to weaken political will in that quarter.  The passage of days, weeks, and, ultimately, months, will allow Gaddafi to use indirect means to foster discontent within rebel ranks, to bend the uncommitted increasingly in his direction.  And, time's slow passage provides for the opportunity for Gaddafi to strengthen his own forces and gain more support from regimes hostile to the West.

The hands of time also strangle any real commitment on the part of President Obama to the insurgents to fade.  The same applies to any American indignation or revulsion over the acts of Gaddafi's killers.  He is betting that We the People will lose interest in Libya and wander off--with the American president at the head of the parade.  Gaddafi knows that the shelf life of even the toughest of Obama tough talk is short.

Gaddafi's act of apparent preemptive surrender will go a long way to assuring that the world is stuck with his noxious presence for some time to come.  Should he be successful in consolidating his territory and even in extending his sway deeper into the insurgent heartland around Benghazi, the probability of the reemergence of Gaddafi 1.0 grows high.  A slow, incremental victory, even a victory so gradual in coming as to be insensible, is nonetheless a victory.  With victory comes the aftermath--the scores to be settled.  And, it scarcely needs mentioning, Gaddafi believes he has a number of scores to settle.

So, the game in Libya will go on.

So also will the game in Bahrain.

The situation in Bahrain is looking more and more dismal by the day.  Underneath the cosmetic changes, the most dramatic of which was the demolition of the Pearl Roundabout's iconic image, the reality of the violent cleavage between the Shiite majority and the ruling Sunni minority continues.  Also continuing is the direct presence of Saudi Arabian armed forces and the indirect involvement of Iranian agents of influence.

The great Saudi-Iranian cold war has taken on a definitely warmish aspect.  The Iranian press has been loudly playing the ancient claim that Bahrain is a former province of Iran in a manner which reminds one of the mood music played by Saddam Hussein regarding Kuwait as Iraq's thirteenth province.  The Saudis are becoming  increasingly anxious over the role played by Iranian agents in fomenting unrest not only among Bahrain's Shiite population but that five percent of Saudi Arabia's which is both Shiite and living in the oil rich Eastern Province.

While always couched in religious terms the contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran is purely secular in both its motivation and goal.  Each sees itself in the role of regional hegemon.  Each defines its role as regional hegemon in terms of nationalism.  This conflict has as little to do with theology, with the doctrinal split separating Shia from Wahhibist Sunni as earlier contests for regional hegemonic status.  Religion is invoked as a justification or as a weapon of psychological warfare, but is not at the center of the contest.

The US is caught between the two regional millstones.  Saudi Arabia is obviously the better candidate for regional hegemonic status from our perspective.  Bahrain is not simply a client of Saudi Arabia, it hosts an important (albeit not critical) base of US naval operations.  Further, the future of Bahrain has strong implications for other Gulf states, all of which are important to either US economic or strategic interests.

There are a couple of ground rules in the Game of Bahrain which are evident already.  The first is simply that there is no way the Sunni rulers of either Bahrain or Saudi Arabia will allow more than token, symbolic power sharing with the Shiite majority.  There is too much fear of Tehran inspired or facilitated subversion to permit any genuine sharing of political authority, at least in the short- to mid-term.  The second is that neither the Saudi nor the Bahraini king will be satisfied with anything less than total and high profile American support.  Our influence is directly proportionate to the openness of administration support.

In contrast, the opposition in Bahrain takes us at our pro-reform, pro-democracy word.  Any evident slackening in either area or any lessening of pressure on the government to end its suppression will serve to enhance the credibility of Tehran's agents.  A misstep in dealing with the opponents of the current regime in Bahrain would give great advantage to Iran.

Obama's let-Europe-take-the-point approach worked in Libya--up to a point.  A similar dilatory course of action will fail miserably in Bahrain.

That is a fact to keep in mind as the game goes on.